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Abstract
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the eﬀects of scientiﬁc and com-
mercial incentives in R&D organisations. We build a simple repeated model of
a researcher capable of obtaining innovative ideas. Although they reduce the time
spent on research, we show that commercialisation incentives also aﬀect the choice of
research projects. Commercial rewards induce a more intensive search for (ex-post)
path-breaking innovations, which are more likely to be generated through (ex-ante)
riskier research programs. We derive the organisation’s optimal incentive scheme in
terms of the researcher’s characteristics. We show that organisations should use a
high level of commercial incentives for scientists who have strong or weak intrinsic
preferences for research. For those with strong preferences, the organisation needs
to induce development, while for those with weak ones, it needs to induce eﬀort.
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1 Introduction
The success of R&D organisations depends, as their name indicates, on both research and
development. The long-run proﬁts of pharmaceutical ﬁrms, for instance, depend, not only
on the successful development of potentially marketable drugs, but also on the ability to
understand and solve fundamental scientiﬁc problems (Cockburn et al., 1999b). Although
investments in pure research might not have an immediate payoﬀ, they contribute to the
ﬁrms’ long-run capabilities and to their “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989
and Gambardella, 1992). Novartis, for example, states that “the breadth of science we
encompass is tremendous, embracing the entire spectrum from fundamental to clinical
investigation”. Drug companies such as Novartis, Merck and AstraZeneca have been ag-
gressively recruiting researchers from academic centres. But it is not only drug companies
that recruit researchers with a “taste” for science (Stern, 2004). IBM Research hires PhD
and post-doc researchers in nanotechnology and computational biology; Microsoft hires
mathematicians in order “to pursue outstanding questions in computer sciences”.
Similarly, the ability of universities and other public research institutions to attract
funds no longer depends exclusively on research performance. Funds stemming from
patents, licences and contract research are needed to compensate for the declining share
of government funding (Mansﬁeld, 1995). As argued by Etzkowitz (2003), research univer-
sities around the world are becoming “quasi-ﬁrms”, in the sense that they are increasingly
encouraged to develop and sell their knowledge and technology.
Thus, managers in all R&D organisations (both ﬁrms and universities) need to balance
incentives for obtaining scientiﬁc results with incentives for producing patents and licences.
This paper spells out, in a ﬁrst step, the eﬀects of commercial and research rewards
on the allocation of time between research on the one hand, and development on the
other. We investigate, in a second step, how the introduction of commercial rewards
aﬀects the choice of research projects. We analyse, in particular, the concerns of various
commentators who claim that the introduction of commercial rewards in academia might
be “skewing” research, from basic towards more applied research projects (Florida and
Cohen, 1999). In a third step, we design the optimal incentive scheme taking into account
the organisation’s objectives and the employee’s characteristics.
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Indeed, research organisations diﬀer, to a great extent, as to what importance they
attach to scientiﬁc results versus commercial value. Research intensive companies, for
example, are more likely to prioritise commercial value than universities or other public
research institutions. But there might also be diﬀerences across universities and across
ﬁrms. Following the Bayh-Dole Act, some universities, such as Iowa University, have
included technology licensing and commercial arrangements in their strategic plans, while
others have not. Cockburn et al. (1999a) identify and measure varying intensities of
research incentives in drug companies, using the importance given to the standing in the
research community as a factor for promotion and other rewards.1
R&D contracts also need to take into account the preferences of the recruited scientists.
As argued by Stern (2004), scientists are a special type of employee. First, researchers are
not only driven by promotion and monetary rewards but also by peer recognition and the
“puzzle” joy (Stephan and Levin, 1992). Researchers might have an intrinsic preference for
research, besides the explicit incentives provided by the organisation. Second, scientists
value (and are oﬀered) substantial discretion in the choice of research projects.
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the eﬀects of scientiﬁc and commercial
incentives on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher
capable of obtaining innovative ideas. In each period, the researcher might decide to
undertake new research, thus generating a new idea. In our basic model, each idea has
both scientiﬁc and potential commercial value, in line with recent evidence that shows
that a single piece of knowledge may contribute to both scientiﬁc research and useful
commercial applications (the “Pasteur’s quadrant”).2 Alternatively, the researcher may
decide to develop prior research into a commercially valuable innovation. If he does so,
however, the researcher forgoes the opportunity to undertake new research and therefore
1For a description of how large research-intensive organisations measure success and provide incentives
for the diﬀerent “tiers” of the R&D ﬁrm (i.e. from pure research to development), see Hauser and
Zettelmeyer (1997).
2This line of research started with Stokes (1997). The canonical example is the French chemist Louis
Pasteur, who, acting as a consultant for the French wine industry, conﬁrmed the germ theory of disease.
Murray (2002) provides a more recent case study of the “oncomouse”, a discovery that was also a product,
and fundamentally aﬀected the pace and direction of genetic cancer research. Following Murray (2002)
and Murray and Stern (2007) we posit that papers and patents encode the same piece of knowledge.
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the chance to have a new idea in that period.
We analyse, in the ﬁrst place, how scientiﬁc and market incentives aﬀect the allocation
of a researcher’s time between research and development. Not surprisingly, higher com-
mercial rewards induce the researcher to develop more and therefore to spend less time on
research. We argue, however, that the introduction of commercial objectives also aﬀects
the choice of research projects. At least according to one measure, researchers should
have incentives to conduct more basic research, contrary to what the “skewing problem”
would suggest. Indeed, we show that the introduction of commercial rewards prompts
researchers to increase the search for (ex-post) high-quality ideas, which are more likely
to be generated through (ex-ante) riskier research programs. Although risk is associated
with all forms of research, high uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of basic research.
As Nelson (1959) states in his seminal paper, “moving from the applied-science end of the
spectrum to the basic-science end, the degree of uncertainty about the results of speciﬁc
research projects increases”. As documented by Hauser and Zettelmeyer (1997), managers
of R&D ﬁrms also think that basic research is the most uncertain one.
We also characterise the optimal incentive scheme for research workers. Although
universities and research-intensive ﬁrms have diﬀerent objectives, both of them can now
use commercial and scientiﬁc incentives to motivate and induce their researchers to spend
an optimal amount of time in research, on the one hand, and in development, on the
other. We show that organisations should use a high level of commercial incentives for
researchers at both ends of the scale of intrinsic preferences for research. For those with
strong preferences, the organisation needs to induce more development. For those with
weak preferences it needs commercial rewards to provide incentives to work. We show that
R&D ﬁrm’s proﬁts at the optimum might also have an inverted-U-shape relationship with
respect to the intrinsic preferences for research. This means that it might be optimal,
even for non-scientiﬁc-oriented organisations, to recruit scientists with some taste for
science. At the same time, though, it might be optimal to ban or limit the publications
for researchers with strong intrinsic preferences for research.
Our basic model can accommodate ﬁelds or disciplines in which ideas have (ex-ante)
high scientiﬁc value and little commercial interest, or vice-versa. Within a given disci-
pline, however, a given (ex-post) idea of higher scientiﬁc value also has higher commercial
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value. In reality, there are ideas with a low scientiﬁc value and a high commercial value
and vice-versa in the same ﬁeld (falling therefore outside the Pasteur’s quadrant). For
instance, the synthesis of human insulin (a major commercial achievement) was obtained
by Genentech researchers through a method which was rather uninteresting from a sci-
entiﬁc point of view. In contrast, around the same time, Harvard researchers tried to
synthesize human insulin through methods with a higher scientiﬁc novelty, but which
made it more diﬃcult for them to achieve the commercially relevant results (Stern, 1995).
Another example can be found in the works of Peter C. Doherty and Rolf M. Zinkernagel,
who were awarded the 1996 Nobel Prize for the discovery of how the immune system
recognises virus-infected cells. Although there have been no commercial gains from their
discoveries, they are highly relevant to clinical medicine. To accommodate the potential
ex-post diﬀerences between scientiﬁc and commercial value, we consider an extension with
random development value and a three-period version of our basic model. At the same
time, the three-period model allows us to study deadline eﬀects, which would appear if
the researcher is close to retirement, for example.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that analyses the impact of the
introduction of commercial incentives on the choice of research projects.3 Lacetera (2006)
compares the incentives of academic and industrial researchers to perform additional,
cost-reducing research into a given project prior to commercialisation. In his paper, the
unit of analysis is a single project and once the project is completed, no other projects
are available. In our model, the researcher does not choose whether to do more research
on the project. Rather, he faces the trade-oﬀ between commercialising the current idea
and dropping it and venturing into a new research project of uncertain quality.4 In this
3We are concentrating on early-stage research. Aghion et al. (2008), instead, study the respective
advantages and disadvantages of academia and the private sector at diﬀerent stages and show that
university researchers are more eﬀective at an early stage. Using a closely related model Lacetera (2008)
studies ﬁrms’ determinants to outsource research projects to academic organisations, focusing instead on
duration and breadth.
4Several papers have analysed the relations between university and the industry. Macho-Stadler et al.
(1996) and Jensen and Thursby (2001), for example, analyse the optimal contract between a university
and a company. Banal-Estañol et al. (2008) estimate the impact of industry collaboration on academic
research output.
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sense, our paper is complementary to his. He ﬁnds that a greater focus on commercial-
isation can lead to additional research into a project and we ﬁnd that the introduction
of commercialisation can lead to more intensive research for ex-post path-breaking in-
novations. Thursby et al. (2007) analyse the impact of licensing on the time spent on
basic and applied research in a life cycle context. They show that basic research does not
need to suﬀer from licensing if one assumes that basic and applied research eﬀorts are
complementary.
We believe that this paper is also the ﬁrst to characterise the optimal provision of
commercial and scientiﬁc incentives in a dynamic context. Our model shares some fea-
tures with the static moral hazard models in which the agent simultaneously performs
multiple tasks. This setup, ﬁrst analysed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), has been
applied to research and development by Cockburn et al. (1999a). These papers identify
complementarities between research and development. Our model, as opposed to theirs,
is dynamic, and explicitly recognises the trade-oﬀ between allocating time to one activity
or the other in each point in time.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model and Section 3 studies the optimal allocation of time between research and devel-
opment. Section 4 analyses the choice of research projects. Section 5 characterises the
optimal contract. Section 6 analyses a ﬁnite version of our basic model that allows us
to study deadline eﬀects. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Basic Model
Consider the following repeated model of a risk-neutral researcher. In each period, he
spends his time either doing research or being involved in further development of prior
knowledge. If he pursues research he obtains, at the end of the period, an “idea” of
random quality q, drawn from an independent and identical distribution F (q), density
f(q) > 0 for all q, expected value q, and support [0, Q]. As stressed by this formulation,
the outcome q of research project F (q) is inherently uncertain.
In line with recent literature in the economics of science (Murray and Stern, 2007),
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the research output might have scientiﬁc and commercial value. The scientiﬁc content
is publishable in a scientiﬁc journal and does not jeopardise further patent rights.5 The
researcher derives a utility of αq, where α denotes the marginal beneﬁt of the quality of
the publication to the researcher. This parameter may reﬂect the puzzle joy, tenure, peer
recognition concerns and/or the possibility to obtain monetary prizes or funding from
public grants.
In the following period, the researcher may undertake a new research project and
obtain, at the end of the period, a new idea. Alternatively, he might decide to spend
time in the commercial development of the previous period’s output. This might involve
patenting and ﬁnding and collaborating with a licensing ﬁrm to develop a commercially
valuable innovation. Or, it could consist of doing consultancy, in being involved in a
spin-oﬀ or in spending time in any activity related to the scientiﬁc output that would
allow him to obtain extra ﬁnancial gains from the discovery.
At the end of the development period, the commercial value of an output of quality
q is μq − A. The parameter μ may be linked to the discipline; academic research in
engineering, for example, may have a higher μ than in physical sciences. The parameter
A reﬂects the cost of turning the innovation into a commercial product or, in the case of
academic research, the diﬃculty of ﬁnding a company interested in licensing inventions.
This cost is net of those commercial values which are not related to the quality of the
idea.6 We assume that the commercial value is an increasing function of the quality of
the ideas (i.e. μ > 0) and that ideas of the lowest quality do not have commercial value
(i.e. A > 0), while the ones of the highest quality do (μQ > A). In our basic setup, the
applicability factors μ and A are certain. As discussed in Section 4, it would be equivalent
to assume that they are random, as long as the realisations are not observed until the
end of the development period. In Sections 4 and 6 we discuss the cases in which the
5We discuss at the end of Section 3 what happens if a scientiﬁc publication is delayed by commer-
cialisation. Further, publications do not have strategic eﬀects in our setup. If there was competition
between researchers, publishing could also be used as a strategic instrument to aﬀect the R&D race (see
for example Bar, 2006).
6These ﬁxed beneﬁts should have already been subtracted from the ﬁxed costs. We are assuming
that the beneﬁts do not outweigh the costs, avoiding the possibility that the worst commercial ideas are
developed. Relaxing this assumption, though, would only create an extra case in Proposition 2 below.
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researcher observes μ and A, respectively, at the end of the research period.
When selling the innovation the researcher receives a share s (∈ (0, 1)) of the commer-
cial beneﬁts of the innovation. This can be interpreted as the share that the institution
is paying to the scientist, or as the revenue from commercialisation net of the overhead
charge, or “Compton Tax”, when the researcher is the residual claimant. In the case
in which the development period represents the involvement in a spin-oﬀ, A could be
interpreted as the sunk-cost of creating the spin-oﬀ and s as the shares received by the
researcher (see for example, Macho-Stadler et al., 2008).7
As the survey results of Jensen et al. (2003) conﬁrm, even academic researchers need
to be involved in development to ensure commercial success. We assume that without this
period of development, the idea does not have commercial value. By being involved in
development, however, the researcher forgoes the opportunity to undertake new research
and to receive a new idea in that period. In our setup, thus, the conﬂict between scientiﬁc
reward and commercial gains only appears in terms of the time that development subtracts
from conducting research. Research is motivated both for fundamental scientiﬁc interest
and commercial gain (pertaining thus to the “Pasteur’s quadrant”). In our basic model,
the quality of the publications and the quality of the technology developed are positively
correlated.
This model is inﬁnitely repeated and time is discounted by δ (∈ (0, 1)). Indeed, an
inﬁnite horizon setup is appropriate if after each period the researcher believes that the
model will continue for an additional period with some probability. Another advantage of
this formulation is that our results are not distorted by the existence of a ﬁnal date. This
model, however, is not dynamic in the sense that there are no diﬀerences between periods,
i.e., there is neither learning from past research nor accumulation of capabilities over time.
While these dimensions are important, the main part of the paper aims, as a ﬁrst step, at
studying the simplest situation where researchers are confronted with the research versus
development decision. In Section 6, we consider a ﬁnite version of our basic model, which
7We are assuming that, when sold, the quality of the innovation is veriﬁable. The literature on markets
for technology suggests the use of a menu of ﬁxed fees and royalties or equity to signal the quality of the
invention or to separate bad applications of the technology from good ones (Gallini and Wright, 1990,
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 1991, and Beggs, 1992).
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allows us to study deadline eﬀects (as they would appear if, for example, the researcher
is close to retirement) and, at the same time, to consider non-stationary research and
development outcomes.
3 Time Allocation
After obtaining an idea q in the previous period the researcher decides, at the beginning
of the new period, whether to develop this idea further or to work on a new research
project. Before characterising the optimal allocation of time as a function of the exogenous
parameters, we ﬁrst state the optimal decision as a function of an exogenous “research
continuation value” V . We deﬁne V as the discounted present expected value of the utility
stream of a researcher at the beginning of a period in which he does research.
Lemma 1 For any research continuation value V , there is a unique q◦(V ) such that the
researcher will not develop if and only if q ≤ q◦(V ).
For any exogenous continuation value, the researcher switches to a new research project
unless the output of the previous period has enough commercial prospects. We are now
ready to characterise the cut-oﬀ q◦ and present value V as a function of the exogenous
parameters of the model.
Proposition 2 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop research output
whose quality q < q◦, where q◦ is deﬁned as follows:
(i) q◦ = Q when αq ≥ s (μQ−A) .
(ii) s (μq◦ −A) = αq + δsμ
R Q
q◦ (x− q◦) dF (x) when αq < s (μQ−A) .
The discounted present expected value V for the researcher is,
V = 1
1−δ
h
αq + δsμ
R Q
q◦ (x− q◦) dF (x)
i
.
Intuitively, if the scientiﬁc value of the average publication is, in monetary terms,
higher than the payment from the best innovation, the researcher will never develop an
idea (case i). If this is not the case, then the researcher will develop his best ideas while
dropping the worst ones (case ii). The quality, to which the researcher is indiﬀerent, is
such that the monetary reward after development is equal to the expected opportunity
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cost of a period’s time; namely, the scientiﬁc reward of the average publication plus the
expected monetary reward from an innovation derived from a research output of higher
quality.
This proposition allows us to pin down which changes in the exogenous parameters
induce the researcher to develop more often; that is, when the region of case (i) (in
which he never develops) shrinks and/or when the threshold of case (ii) (above which he
develops) is lower.
Corollary 3 The researcher develops more often, when
(i) the applicability factor, μ, increases;
(ii) the net costs of turning an innovation into a commercial product, A, decrease;
(iii) the discount factor, δ, decreases;
(iv) the marginal utility of the quality of the publication, α, decreases;
(v) the share of the beneﬁts received by the researcher, s, increases.
As one would anticipate, a higher marginal commercial value of the innovation, μ,
and a lower cost of turning the innovation into a commercial product, A, induces more
development. Indeed, the empirical results by Thursby and Thursby (2007) conﬁrm that
the probability that an academic researcher discloses a patent in a given year is higher in
more applied ﬁelds, such as engineering, and in ﬁelds in which the results are in strong
demand by the industry, such as biological sciences.
More interestingly, if the future carries little value (δ low), then researchers do not lose
much from developing in this period and foregoing the possibility of obtaining a better
research outcome. As a result, less patient researchers develop more often. An alternative
interpretation of the discount rate δ is the rate at which ideas are obtained. The corollary
implies that a more proliﬁc scientist (higher δ) should be more reluctant to develop a
given idea. Although he might end up developing more or less in total, the commercial
value of his average innovation should deﬁnitely be higher.
Finally, stronger commercial incentives (a higher s) and a lower emphasis in publica-
tions (a lower α) induce more development. Although the combination (α, s) is exogenous
to the researcher, the organisation determines s and can also aﬀect α, oﬀering, for exam-
ple, publication prizes. As we argue in Section 5, the optimal combination also depends
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on the organisation’ objectives.
4 Project Selection
We now turn to the controversial question of how the introduction of commercial remuner-
ation aﬀects the choice of research projects (F (·)). As we shall see in this section, whether
the researcher chooses more basic or more applied projects hinges crucially on how basic-
ness is deﬁned. One of the potential diﬀerences between basic and applied projects is that
basic projects are riskier than applied projects (Nelson, 1959; Hauser and Zettelmeyer,
1997). But, another potential diﬀerence is that the outcomes of basic projects might,
in expected terms, be more diﬃcult to commercialise and might carry higher scientiﬁc
reward. We shall consider each of these two distinctions in turn.8
4.1 Level of Risk
According to Nelson (1959), when moving from the applied-science to the basic-science end
of the spectrum, the degree of uncertainty about the results of speciﬁc research projects
increases. In what follows, we will show that according to this distinction, researchers
would be more willing to choose projects that are more basic in nature if they were to
receive a share of the ﬁnancial proﬁts from commercialisation. In order to isolate the
eﬀects of this diﬀerence, suppose that the researcher can costlessly choose the level of risk
of his research projects, assuming that the mean and the support of the distribution are
identical.
Proposition 4 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions induces re-
searchers to select riskier projects. By choosing riskier projects, researchers are more
reluctant to develop a given outcome, although they might develop more or less in expected
terms.
8Other papers have also analysed project selection when projects diﬀer on their variance. In Cabral
(2003), for example, two ﬁrms competing in R&D have to strategically choose between two projects, one
of which is a mean-preserving spread of the other. Other distinctions between basic and applied research
are also possible. Basic research projects can have a broader set of applications or, similar to our second
deﬁnition, be characterised by a lower probability of commercial success.
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Figure 1: Researcher’s utility in a given period (for a given V) as a function of the quality
of the idea.
The intuition behind the preference for the risky project follows from the fact that
the researcher acts as if he was risk-loving with respect to the quality of the output. As
we can see in Figure 1, the researcher’s utility as a function of the output quality is a
convex function. Indeed, for a given V , the utility is the maximum of two aﬃne functions
that represent the value from continuing to do research (αq + δV ) and the value from
development (αq + δs [μq −A] + δ2V ). The latter is steeper because better output has
a higher development value. The former has a higher intercept because the researcher
obtains a new idea sooner. As shown in Proposition 2, as long as the remuneration for
the best innovation is high enough, the two lines cross at some point qo.
By choosing riskier projects, researchers are more reluctant to develop a given idea.
Indeed, they are more likely to obtain a better idea in the next period and they are
therefore more willing to drop the current one. As shown in Figure 2, though, they might
end up developing more ideas in expected terms. Although F+(x) is a mean-preserving
spread of F−(x) and therefore the threshold for the former is higher (q+o > q−o), the
ex-ante probability of developing is also higher (F+(q+o) < F−(q−o)).
Although the scientiﬁc and commercial rewards were assumed to be linearly increasing
in the quality of the output, this result should hold more generally. Indeed, the intro-
duction of commercial rewards induces the researcher to select between two increasing
12
Figure 2: Distribution F−(·) and a mean preserving spread, F+(·) (Area X=Area Y ).
functions. Assume that the commercial value of an idea of quality q is μ(q)q. Given that
the best innovations have a much higher value than intermediate ones, μ(q) would typi-
cally be not constant as in our model but increasing. This would make the researcher even
more risk-loving than with no commercial rewards. Furthermore, researchers would also
select riskier projects even if the value of the publications is given by α(q)q for any α(q),
and not only when α(q) is constant. Indeed, although he might not always act as if he
was risk-loving he would exhibit more risk-loving behaviour than before the introduction
of commercial rewards.
4.2 Scientiﬁc and Commercial Value
Another potential diﬀerence between basic and more applied research is that the outcomes
of applied projects can be more easily commercialised. In other words, the net costs A
of turning the innovation into a commercial product are lower. At the same time, peer
recognition and the expected value of publication (measured by the parameter α) can be
lower for more applied projects. The next proposition conﬁrms that, according to this
distinction, researchers will be more likely to choose applied projects in the presence of
commercial incentives.
Proposition 5 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions is conducive
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to a selection of projects with lower costs of development and lower scientiﬁc value. By
choosing these projects, researchers spend more time in development and less in research.
Although the eﬀects of each of the two deﬁnitions are diﬀerent, the deﬁnitions are not
mutually exclusive. If basicness is characterised by both higher risk and higher develop-
ment costs and scientiﬁc value, the eﬀect of commercial rewards is ambiguous. Of course, if
more applied projects have much lower development costs, then researchers would choose
more applied research projects even if they are less risky. On the other hand, researchers
would choose research projects that are riskier if the diﬀerence in development costs is
not too large. All in all, the introduction of commercial incentives does not necessarily
“skew” research towards more applied projects.9
4.3 Extensions
Our basic model assumes that the development factor is certain. But it also allows for
the possibility that it is random, as long as the realisation is not observed until the end
of the period of development. Both are equivalent given that only the expectation (and
not the realisation) is relevant for the time allocation decision.
In Banal-Estañol and Macho-Stadler (2007), we consider an extension with random
development value. The researcher realises the commercial value of a piece of knowledge
at the end of the research period, when he also realises its quality. This extension al-
lows us to consider ideas that have, ex-post, low scientiﬁc value and high commercial
interest and vice-versa (falling therefore outside the Pasteur’s quadrant). We show that
ideas that turn out to have high commercial value are more likely to be developed. The
introduction of remuneration still induces researchers to choose riskier projects in terms
of quality. Furthermore, it would also induce researchers to choose projects that have a
riskier commercialisation value.
In the basic model, we also assumed that the decision to develop did not aﬀect the
timing of the publications. However, there is evidence that publications of results that
9An important consideration for social welfare, which is beyond the reach of our model, is whether sev-
eral researchers would be pushed to select the same project. This might still be optimal if the duplication
of eﬀorts increases the likehood of having a good discovery.
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have been the subject of a patent application might be delayed (Geuna and Nesta, 2006).
Suppose that if the researcher develops, then he cannot publish the scientiﬁc content until
the end of the development period. The researcher would develop less often, given that
the delay makes development less attractive. But, as shown in detail in Banal-Estañol
and Macho-Stadler (2007), the results are qualitative the same. The introduction of
commercial incentives still induces research that is riskier. The eﬀect, however, is weaker
than without delay.
5 Management of R&D Activities
Research organisations need to motivate researchers and ensure that they allocate an
“optimal” amount of time to research and development. In this section, we analyse the
optimal incentive scheme for an organisation that could use commercial and scientiﬁc
incentives. We assume that the researcher works in a predetermined pool of projects and
we thus abstract the problem of project selection. But, we extend our analysis to allow
for the possibility that the researcher does not exert much eﬀort. The scientist decides
whether to exert eﬀort or “work”, and if so, whether to do research or commercialise as
before.
To be more precise, we assume that if the researcher works in a given period, either
in research or development, he incurs a cost c. Alternatively, he can decide to not per-
form an activity, at a 0 cost. We assume that eﬀort is not veriﬁable and therefore not
contractible. This implies that the scientist cannot be compelled to provide eﬀort, she
has to be motivated to supply it. On the other hand, we assume again that the scientiﬁc
results and the commercial revenue are observable and contractible, but the “stopping
rule” (time allocation) is not. The researcher cannot be forced to stop doing research and
commercialise at a particular point, he has to be induced to do so.
5.1 The Optimal Contract
The organisation pays the researcher through a contract (s, α+), where s (∈ [0, 1]) is his
share of the commercial revenues and α+ (≥ 0) is a prize (in monetary terms) awarded
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to the quality of the research, in addition to his intrinsic puzzle joy or peer recognition,
αo. That is, we decompose the marginal beneﬁt of the quality of the publications α as
α ≡ α++αo. As a result, a given researcher’s α depends on the organisation he works for.
Note that in what follows we can ignore the researcher’s participation constraint because
it can be guaranteed through a ﬁxed transfer, if necessary.
As mentioned in the introduction, research organisations diﬀer as to what importance
they attach to scientiﬁc results versus commercial value. We denote the relative weight
that the organisation attaches to publications as ρ ∈ [0,∞) whereas the (normalised)
weight attached to the organisation’s share of the commercial applications is 1. We
are thus omitting the uninteresting case in which the organisation is only concerned with
publications. Higher values of ρ imply a higher concern for scientiﬁc reputation or prestige
from successful research and a lower importance of commercial proﬁts.
As we did for the researcher, we denote the discounted present expected proﬁts for
the organisation at the beginning of a period in which the researcher does research as B.
Lemma 6 Assuming that the researcher exerts eﬀort in each period, the discounted present
expected value B for the organisation is
B(α+, s) =
(ρ− α+)q + δ(1− s)
R Q
q◦ (μx−A) dF (x)
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) ,
where q◦ is deﬁned in Proposition 2.
The organisation obtains its discounted value of the average publication less the dis-
counted average scientiﬁc monetary prize awarded to the researcher (ﬁrst term in the
numerator) plus a share (1−s) of the potential ﬁnancial beneﬁt for developing and selling
an idea of high quality, q > q◦, in the following period (second term in the numerator).
Time is discounted by δ (ﬁrst term in the denominator) and by the possibility of not doing
research in that period (second term in the denominator). The expression for the value
for the organisation (B) is similar to that of the researcher (V ), deﬁned in Proposition 2
(especially when expressed as in (2), in the proof).
During a research period, the researcher devotes eﬀort, assuming he will also do so
in the future, if and only if his expected utility from working, V − c, is greater than his
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Figure 3: The isolevel dashed curves represent the time allocation constraint (TA) for a
given qo. The isolevel curve for q◦ = Q is the thick-squared region. The shadowed area
represents the contracts satisfying the incentive to provide eﬀort constraint (IE).
expected utility from not exerting eﬀort, 0 + δV. Consequently, the “incentive to provide
eﬀort” constraint (IE hereafter) can be written as
¡
αo + α+
¢
q + δsμ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x) ≥ c, (IE)
where q◦ (to which we will refer as the “time allocation” constraint or TA) is again deﬁned
in Proposition 2.
Figure 3 represents the TA and IE constraints. The time allocation constraint for any
q◦ is represented by the isolevel dashed curves. The isolevel curve for q◦ = Q, in which
the researcher never develops, is the thick squared region. The set of contracts satisfying
the IE is the shadowed area. For each cost level c, the IE constraint implicitly deﬁnes a
family of contracts (s, α+) that induces the researcher to provide eﬀort. Commercial and
scientiﬁc incentives are substitutes and therefore the boundary curve, in terms of α+, is
a non-increasing function of s. By providing higher research incentives, the organisation
can oﬀer a lower share of the commercial proﬁts. If α+ is high enough, it is not necessary
to increase s further, though.
The following lemma characterises the set of contracts that induces the researcher to
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provide eﬀort.
Lemma 7 The contracts (s, α+) that induce the researcher to provide eﬀort...
(i) are the set of all feasible contracts if c ≤ αoq;
(ii) satisfy s > sm ≡ αq
(μQ−A) or α+ > 0 (or both) if c > αoq.
From the IE constraint, if αo ≥ c/q the researcher would provide eﬀort for any s
and α+, thanks to the intrinsic value from scientiﬁc research. If, instead, αo < c/q the
incentives should be provided either via α+ or via s. If, for example, α+ ≥ c/q−αo > 0 the
researcher would provide eﬀort for any s, thanks to the scientiﬁc value of the publications.
If, instead, c/q − αo > α+ ≥ 0, the organisation needs to provide s > sm to induce
some commercialisation and therefore positive ﬁnancial beneﬁts from development. All
contracts that specify s ∈ [0, sm] are, in practice, identical because they do not induce
commercialisation (see Proposition 2). Therefore, without loss of generality, we will reduce
the set of feasible shares to s ∈ [sm, 1] from now on.
The organisation’s problem is in choosing the optimal contract (s, α+) in order to
maximise B subject to the IE, TA and the feasible intervals for α+ and s,
max
s,α+
B(α+, s) (1)
s.t. TA, IE, sm ≤ s ≤ 1, α+ ≥ 0.
In order to present the solution of the problem, let us denote qe the stopping rule that
maximises the total surplus, B+V. Further, deﬁne se and α+e the “unrestricted” contract
that induces qe and satisﬁes IE with equality (se and α+e might not be within the feasible
bounds of α+ and s).
Proposition 8 The optimal incentive scheme (α+∗, s∗) satisﬁes:
(i) For c ≤ αoq then, α+∗ = 0 and sm ≤ s∗ ≤ 1.
(ii) For c > αoq then
(ii.1) α+∗ = α+e and s∗ = se if se ≤ 1 and α+e ≥ 0,
(ii.2) α+∗ = αc and s∗ = 1 if se > 1,
(ii.3) α+∗ = 0 and sc ≤ s∗ ≤ 1 if se ≤ 1 and α+e < 0,
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where αc and sc are implicitly deﬁned by
(αc + αo)q + δμ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x) = c and αoq + scδμ
Z Q
qo
(x− qo) dF (x) = c.
Figure 3 also helps to understand the results in Proposition 8. An organisation can
obtain the same revenue at a lower cost by decreasing s and α+ simultaneously, provided
that it keeps q◦ constant. Hence, (α+∗, s∗) has to be such that IE is binding or it is in
a corner solution for α+ or s. If c ≤ αoq (case i) any contract satisﬁes the IE constraint
and is therefore never binding (Lemma 7). The organisation chooses a contract on the
horizontal axis, i.e. it does not allocate extra incentives to scientiﬁc results (α+ = 0) and
sets the share s in order to maximise B given TA and α+ = 0. If the organisation is only
interested in inducing research, the optimal contract would have minimal shares for the
researcher (s∗ = sm). But if the organisation is interested in inducing some development
then it will include additional shares (s∗ > sm).
If c > αoq, and the socially optimal stopping rule can be achieved with a feasible
contract satisfying IE, then this contract will be the solution (case ii.1). If this contract
is not feasible, i.e. if se > 1 or α+e < 0, the organisation will choose a contract in the
boundaries of the space of feasible parameters, either by giving all the commercial rewards
to the researcher (case ii.2) or by giving him no extra scientiﬁc incentives (case ii.3). In
the latter, the organisation will, as in case (i), choose the optimal s in order to maximise
B given TA and α+ = 0.
5.2 Comparative Statics
We now explore how the optimal incentive scheme is aﬀected by the researcher’s charac-
teristics and the organisation’s objectives. The following corollary shows how the organi-
sation needs to adapt its incentive scheme to the researcher’s level of intrinsic motivation
to perform research.
Corollary 9 Suppose that q is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then, there exists αo(< 2c)
such that for αo < αo, the optimal share s∗ is decreasing in αo. If αo > 2c, the optimal
share s∗ is increasing in αo for ρ < ρ(αo) and A = 0.
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Interestingly, organisations should use a higher level of commercialisation shares for
suﬃciently high but also for suﬃciently low levels of intrinsic research interest. For high
levels of αo, the organisation needs to use a high s to induce development while for low
levels of αo, the organisation needs to use a high share to provide incentives to work.
In order to further illustrate how the optimal incentive scheme changes with the pa-
rameters, in Table 1 we present a numerical example based on a pool of ideas following
a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1] with μ = 2, A = 0, δ = 0.4. The ﬁrst two
blocks show again how the optimal contract, the organisation’s proﬁts and the stopping
rule (rows 3 to 6) change with αo (row 2). Block 1 considers an organisation exclusively
interested in commercial revenue and Block 2 an organisation that weights commercial
revenue and scientiﬁc reputation equally. Given that c = 0.1, we are in case (i) of Propo-
sition 8 if αo ≥ 0.2 and in case (ii) if αo < 0.2.
αo(ρ = 0, c = 0.1) αo(ρ = 1, c = 0.1) ρ (αo= 0.1, c = 0.1) c (αo= 0.1, ρ = 0)
0.5 0.2 0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0 2 ≥ 4 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.4
α+∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 0.08 0.1 0 0 0 0.2
s∗ 0.27 0.15 0.34 0.22 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.09 ≤ 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.21 1
B∗ 0.30 0.38 0.32 1.01 1.06 0.96 0.38 1.71 3.25 0.42 0.42 0.38 −0.12
q◦ 0.50 0.40 0.15 0.59 0.49 0.34 0.2 0.5 1 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.2
Table 1: Optimal contract (α+∗, s∗), maximum proﬁts (B∗) and stopping rule (qo) for a uniform
distribution over [0, 1] (F (x) = x) with μ = 2, A = 0 and δ = 0.4.
An organisation that is not concerned with scientiﬁc reputation (ρ = 0) will not use
research prizes to induce eﬀort (Block 1). The incentives to work will be induced with
the commercialisation shares, which also give incentives to develop. An organisation
that has the same interest in commercialisation and in scientiﬁc reputation (ρ = 1) will
use both commercial and scientiﬁc incentives to motivate a researcher with low intrinsic
interest to publish (last column of the second block). As shown in the previous corollary,
organisations use a high level of commercialisation shares for high and for low levels of
intrinsic research interest. The table also shows that the organisation’s proﬁts at the
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optimum have an inverted-U-shape with respect to αo. This means that, even non-
scientiﬁc-oriented organisations (ρ = 0) can ﬁnd it optimal to hire a scientiﬁc-oriented
researcher (αo > 0). A researcher who is much too research-driven, though, can also lower
proﬁts.
The third block highlights how the optimal contract changes with ρ (second row). A
highly research-oriented institution (high ρ), may decide to avoid commercialisation in
equilibrium (e.g. if ρ ≥ 4 in our example). The researcher receives extra recognition for
scientiﬁc output but he is induced to not commercialise (s∗ = sm = 0.04). Comparing
the stopping rules, more commercial-oriented institutions will intuitively induce a lower
threshold, q◦.10 But, even for the organisations that are exclusively interested in com-
mercial revenue, it is never optimal to induce the researcher to develop every idea. Poor
ideas (low q) are better abandoned.
The fourth block illustrates how the optimal contract changes with c (second row). If
c = 0.02 (ﬁrst column) every contract satisﬁes the incentive to exert eﬀort constraint. The
optimal contract corresponds to the case (i) of Proposition 8 in which s∗ is interior. For
c = 0.06 the organisation could choose the s that makes the incentive to exert eﬀort (IE)
binding, sc. However it does not. It is still optimal to choose the same contract as in the
ﬁrst column (which would now satisfy s∗ > sc) (case ii.3). If c = 0.1, the IE is binding in
equilibrium and the contract includes a share s that decreases with c (case ii.1). Finally,
if the costs are very high (c = 0.4) even for s = 1 the incentive constraint to exert eﬀort
would not be satisﬁed unless α+ > 0 (case ii.2). The researcher keeps all the revenue from
commercialisation and, in addition, he has to receive a prize for publications in order to
have an incentive to work. If there are no other beneﬁts from hiring the researcher (except
those included in B), the organisation might be better oﬀ not hiring the researcher, given
that B∗ < 0.
Our model assumes that organisations cannot prevent researchers from enjoying pure
research results and therefore α+ has to be non-negative. A negative α+ would involve
prohibiting publications or asking the researchers to pay for their publications (in fu-
ture wages, for example). Although the former might have involved extra costs for the
10According to our deﬁnition of B, it does not make sense to compare the absolute proﬁts B∗ for
diﬀerent values of ρ since, for any given contract, an organisation with a higher ρ generates more proﬁts.
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organisation, the latter might have generated further revenues. Suppose here that it is
possible to set a negative α+ and that this does not involve extra costs or revenues. Table
1 shows that it might indeed be optimal to set a negative α+. Block 1 shows that a
commercially-oriented organisation (ρ = 0) increases proﬁts by reducing the researchers’
intrinsic interests to publish from αo = 0.5 until αo = 0.2 or αo = 0. An eﬀective re-
duction of αo can be obtained with a negative α+. By allowing α+ to be negative, the
optimal contract always belongs to cases (ii.1) or (ii.2) of Proposition 8.
6 Retirement Eﬀects
In this section we consider a three-period version of our basic model, which allows us to
study deadline eﬀects. These eﬀects would appear if the researcher is close to retirement,
for example. At the same time, it enables us to consider non-stationary research and
development outcomes. We also allow for the possibility that the net costs of development,
which include the diﬀerence between the scientiﬁc and the additional commercial value (on
top of the random quality of the idea), are random, with positive or negative realisations.
Formally, the quality and the net costs of development, qi and Ai, are uncertain at the
beginning and realised, at the same time, at the end of each research period. Although
the game has three periods, the third period may be diﬀerent depending on whether the
researcher spent the second one in research or in development. Accordingly, allowing past
experience to matter, we denote the nodal points as i, i = 1, 2, 3, 30. We assume that the
variables qi and Ai are distributed independently according to Gi(q) and Hi(A) on the
support [0, Qi] and
£
Ai, Ai
¤
, respectively, where Ai < 0 and Ai > 0. Similarly, we denote
the researcher’s marginal beneﬁt of the quality of research and his share of commercial
revenues in period i as αi and si, respectively.
In this model, the researcher needs to make a time allocation decision at most twice,
after the ﬁrst research outcome, (q1, A1), and after the second, (q2, A2), in the case in
which he undertakes research in that period.
Proposition 10 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop research output
whose quality and net costs of development (qi, Ai) (i = 1, 2) are such that Ai > bAi(qi),
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where bAi(qi) are implicitly deﬁned by
s3(μz − bA2(z)) = α30q30 and s2(μz − bA1(z)) = K( bA2(q2)),
where K( bA2(q2)) is deﬁned as
α2q2− δα30q30 + δs3
Z Q2
0
Z ?A2(x)
A2
(μx−y)dH2(y)dG2(x)+ δα3q3
Z Q2
0
(1−H2( bA2(x))dG2(x).
The ﬁrst condition shows that an increase in s3 or a decrease in α30q30 enlarges the
set of combinations of quality and net costs for which the researcher develops after the
second research period. Similarly, the second condition shows that an increase in s2 or in
α3q3 will also enlarge the region in which the researcher stops after the ﬁrst period.
Corollary 11 In a stationary environment (αi = α, si = s, Hi(y) = H(y), Fi(y) = F (y),
for i = 1, 2, 3, 30), the researcher is more likely to develop in the third period than in the
second.
In the last period the researcher is more likely to develop because the opportunity
costs of development do not include the loss of a potentially good idea. This result is
consistent with the fact that the number of patent disclosures in academia increases with
tenure and age, at least until the middle ages (Thursby and Thursby, 2007). We could
also interpret a result of the inﬁnite model in a similar way. One could argue that, with
tenure and age, the marginal utility of scientiﬁc publications decreases, which is shown to
induce more development in Corollary 3.
We now turn to the changes in the level of risk. For simplicity, we concentrate on the
case in which q is a random variable and A is a parameter (the conclusions for the case
in which q is a parameter and A is random are similar). Suppose further that μ = 1 and
A1 = A2 = 0. Notice that a mean preserving spread of G3(q) and G30(q) does not aﬀect
the time allocation decisions. A mean-preserving spread of G1(q) does not aﬀect the time
allocation decision either but it will aﬀect the present expected value V . As we can see in
Proposition 10, G2(q) aﬀects the time allocation behaviour at the beginning of the second
period but not at the beginning of the third.
The next proposition shows ﬁrst that the result obtained in Section 4 is also true here.
Namely, the introduction of commercial rewards induces researchers to choose projects
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that have a higher level of risk. Here, we are also able to analyse the marginal incentives
to take riskier projects when the share of commercial proﬁts, s2 and/or s3, increases.
Proposition 12 Consider μ = 1 and A1 = A2 = 0. The introduction of remuneration
for commercial inventions induces researchers to select riskier projects. Moreover, the
incentives to select ideas from distributions that are mean-preserving spreads of each other:
i) increase with s2, and increase with s3 if and only if qo1 > q¯1, in period 1,
ii) decrease with s2, and increase with s3, in period 2.
This proposition shows that the eﬀects of the researcher’s share of commercial proﬁts
on the incentives to take riskier projects in periods 1 and 2 are not clear. If the researcher
chooses the same research project in both periods (i.e. chooses a research “proﬁle”)
and the shares change simultaneously in both periods (e.g., if s2 = s3), the eﬀects are
combined and it is diﬃcult to reach a conclusion about the direction. This explains why,
in the inﬁnite model, analysing the tendency to select a riskier pool of projects as a
function of the share s is diﬃcult to analyse without having particular functional forms.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the provision of adequate incentives for university and company re-
searchers. Public and private research institutions can use commercial and scientiﬁc
incentives to motivate researchers and induce them to spend an optimal amount of time
in research, on the one hand, and in development, on the other.
To understand researchers’ behaviour, we build a simple repeated model of a researcher
who can choose between undertaking new research or developing prior research into com-
mercially valuable innovations. We show that, unless the quality of the outcome has
enough commercial prospects to compensate for the delay, the researcher should under-
take a new research project. The opportunity costs of development and commercialisation
include not only scientiﬁc output but also the opportunity to obtain a more lucrative in-
novation. Consistent with the empirical evidence, our comparative statics results indicate
that a researcher spends more time developing if his discipline has greater applicability
and if the marginal utility of scientiﬁc publications is lower.
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We also show that the introduction of commercial incentives aﬀects not only the time
spent in research and in development but also the choice of research projects. Therefore we
are able to analyse one of the “unintended” eﬀects of the Bayh-Dole Act, which increased
the incentives to transfer university research to the market. Some groups have expressed
concerns about the possibility that academic faculties “skew” the nature of their research,
selecting applied rather than basic research projects, and therefore putting the future of
the industrial base at stake. We show that the introduction of commercial remuneration
pushes the researcher to prefer riskier projects. Given that higher levels of uncertainty
are related to more basic research, the introduction of commercial rewards might not only
preserve but also enhance the choice of more basic research projects.
Although the choice of research projects cannot be measured directly, existing indirect
evidence suggests that the much-feared switch from basic to applied research in academia
is not occurring. Thursby and Thursby (2002) conclude that changes in the direction of
faculty research seem to be relatively less important than other factors in explaining the
increased licensing activity. Thursby and Thursby (2007), as Hicks and Hamilton (1999)
earlier, ﬁnd no systematic change in the proportion of publications in basic versus applied
journals between 1983 and 1999. They also report that the total number of publications
per faculty member more than doubled over the time period, indicating that the number
of publications in basic journals actually increased. A decrease in the quality of university
patents could also be taken as an indication of a trend towards more applied research.
Although Henderson et al. (1998) do ﬁnd a decreasing trend in the quality of university
patents (measured by the number of forward citations), Mowery et al. (2001), Mowery at
al. (2002) and Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) argue that this is due to an increased number
of new and inexperienced technology transfer oﬃces rather than to a systemic change in
the nature of academic research.
Our model is not only consistent with a variety of stylised facts but it also generates a
number of additional testable predictions. First, by choosing riskier projects, researchers
would be more reluctant to develop low-quality research. Instead, they are more willing to
continue undertaking research because they are more likely to obtain higher-quality results
in the future. As a result, it might be that they end up developing less as commercial
rewards increase. Indirect evidence from this eﬀect in academia can also be found in
25
Thursby and Thursby (2007), who state that “the much publicized increase in licensing
activity appears to be concentrated among a minority of faculty”. Second, the commercial
value of developed projects is higher. Again, indirect evidence suggests that most of
the patenting revenues are concentrated among a reduced number of patents. Although
the level of invention disclosures, patent applications and licenses executed increased by
84%, 238% and 161% respectively from 1991 until 2000, the royalty revenue increased
by 520% in the same period. Third, a selection of riskier projects should lead to a more
spread distribution of the quality of the publications. Empirically, one could analyse
whether the quality of the publications, measured for example in citations, of researchers
in departments in which commercial rewards are larger is more spread.
We also characterise the optimal incentive scheme for research workers. We show how
universities and research-intensive ﬁrms should use commercial and scientiﬁc incentives
to motivate and induce their researchers to spend an optimal amount of time in research
and development. The problem of providing incentives to scientists is related to the
problem of providing incentives to the broader group of “knowledge workers”, which
includes computer programmers, engineers and technology managers (for a recent article
on this topic, see Lacetera and Zirulia, 2008). Knowledge workers are meant to create,
distribute, and apply knowledge within their organisations. Incentive schemes may be
needed not only to induce them to work hard but also to induce them to allocate an
optimal amount of time between acquiring new knowledge and developing or transferring
it. Like the researchers, not all knowledge workers are alike. Some are more motivated
than others to perform certain tasks. But knowledge workers can also be incentivised. It
might be possible to include not only a traditional bonus related to the performance of the
ﬁrm, but also rewards to the acquisition and the creation of knowledge. Examples of the
latter include better work environments, access to technologies, and external visibility and
recognition for knowledge improvement. A full investigation of this issue is a challenging
task for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The researcher will be able to sell the innovation if the value for the ﬁrm is larger than
the costs. This deﬁnes two intervals, [0, Aμ ) and [Aμ , Q], depending on the value of q. If
q < Aμ then the researcher will not develop for any V since he will never be able to sell
anyway, αq + δV ≥ αq + δ2V. If Aμ ≤ q ≤ Q then he will be able to sell the innovation if
he develops and therefore he will develop whenever αq+ δs [μq −A] + δ2V ≤ αq+ δV , or
equivalently, when (1− δ)V ≥ s [μq −A].
Denoting m(q) ≡ s [μq −A], the previous discussion implies that, for all V , q◦(V ) is
given by m(q◦(V )) = (1 − δ)V when m(Q) > (1 − δ)V and q◦(V ) = Q when m(Q) ≤
(1− δ)V. Given that m(Q) > 0 (by assumption μQ−A > 0), in order to show that there
exists a unique q◦(V ), we need to show that m(q) is an increasing function and m(0) < 0.
Indeed, m0(q) = sμ > 0 and m(0) = −sA < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose ﬁrstly that the cut-oﬀ chosen by the researcher is q◦ = Q. The researcher
never develops and never sells. Hence V =
R Q
0
αxdF (x) + δV , which simplifying gives
V = 1
1−δαq. The decision q◦ = Q is optimal if and only if (1− δ)V ≥ s [μQ−A], which
substituting gives αq ≥ s (μQ−A) , which corresponds to the region in case (i).
Suppose secondly that the cut-oﬀ chosen by the researcher is q◦ < Q. We have that
V =
Z Q
0
αxdF (x) + δF (q◦)V + δs
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x) + [1− F (q◦)] δ2V,
which, passing all terms in V to the left-hand side of the equality gives
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])V =
Z Q
0
αxdF (x) + δs
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x).
This equality can be rewritten as
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])V = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x). (2)
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On the other hand, using the fact that q◦(V ) should be deﬁned here as (1 − δ)V =
s [μq◦ −A], we can substitute V by s
(1−δ) [μq◦ −A], which leads to
(1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) s [μq◦ −A] = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x). (3)
We can rewrite this equation as,
s [μq◦ −A] + δs [1− F (q◦)] [μq◦ −A]− δs
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x) = αq,
from there we have that q◦ is implicitly deﬁned by
s (μq◦ −A)− δsμ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x) = αq. (4)
Let us now deﬁne j(q) as
j(q) ≡ s (μq −A)− δsμ
Z Q
q
(x− q) dF (x).
Since j0(q) = sμ+δsμ(1−F (q)) > 0, the cut-oﬀ q◦ deﬁned by j(q◦) = αq in (4) is unique.
Finally, we need to check that q◦ ≤ Q. Since j(q◦) = αq and j0(q) > 0, we need that
j(Q) ≥ αq or s (μQ−A) ≥ αq, which corresponds to the region in case (ii).
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove this result, consider two distributions, F−(q) and F+(q), with the same support
[0, Q] and with the same mean (q), and F+(q) being a mean preserving spread of (i.e.
riskier than) F−(q). By deﬁnition,
R
u(x)dF+(x) ≥
R
u(x)dF−(x) for any u(x) deﬁned in
R+, non-decreasing and non-concave. Given that u(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, q] and u(x) = x−q if
x ∈ [q,Q] satisﬁes these conditions, we have that
R Q
q (x− q) dF+(x) ≥
R Q
q (x− q) dF−(x).
In other words, F−(x) second-order stochastically dominates F+(x).
If s is small, the parameters of the model are in the region of case (i) of Proposition 2.
In this region, the researcher is indiﬀerent to the two distributions. If s is high enough,
the parameters are in the region of case (ii). Given F−(q), the threshold quality q−o is
deﬁned as:
s
¡
μq−o −A
¢
− δsμ
Z Q
q−o
¡
x− q−o
¢
dF−(x) = αq.
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Since F+(.) is a mean preserving spread of F−(.), we have that
s
¡
μq−o −A
¢
− δsμ
Z Q
q−o
¡
x− q−o
¢
dF+(x) < αq.
Given that the derivative of the left hand with respect to qo1 is positive and that
s
¡
μq+o −A
¢
− δsμ
Z Q
q+o
¡
x− q+o
¢
dF+(x) = αq,
we have that q+o > q−o. As shown in the proof of the previous proposition, this implies
that V + > V − and therefore the researcher prefers the risky research project.
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove this result, suppose that there are two projects characterised by the parameters
(α1, A1) and (α2, A2), with A1 > A2 and α1 > α2, but otherwise identical. Project 1
is more basic than project 2. According to Proposition 2, we can write the discounted
present expected value for each project i = 1, 2 as
Vi(s) =
1
1− δ [s (μq
◦
i (s)−Ai)] ,
where Vi and q◦i are functions of the share s. The researcher prefers the applied project
(project 2) if and only if
q◦1(s)− q◦2(s) <
A1 −A2
μ .
From Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, one can show that ∂
2qo
∂s∂α < 0 and
∂2qo
∂s∂A < 0. As
a consequence, q◦1(s0) − q◦2(s0) < q◦1(s00) − q◦2(s00) whenever s0 > s00. This implies that
the larger is the share s, the more a researcher is inclined to choose the applied project.
Indeed, if he chooses project 2 when the share is s00, he will continue to prefer that project
for the larger share s0. However, the increase in s can make the researcher switch from
project 1 to project 2. The second part of the Proposition follows directly from Corollary
3.
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Proof of Lemma 6
The organisation payoﬀ B starting in a period in which research is done is equal to
B =
Z Q
0
¡
ρ− α+
¢
xdF (x) + δF (q◦)B + δ(1− s)
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x) + [1− F (q◦)] δ2B,
where q◦ is deﬁned in Proposition 2. Rearranging this expression we have
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])B =
¡
ρ− α+
¢
q + δ(1− s)
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x), (5)
and therefore,
B =
(ρ− α+)q + δ(1− s)
R Q
q◦ (μx−A) dF (x)
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) .
Notice that if q◦ = Q then B = (ρ− α+) q/ (1− δ).
Proof of Proposition 8
Overview of the proof. We need to ﬁnd the solution to the program
max
α+,s
B(α+, s)
s.t.
¡
αo + α+
¢
q + δsμ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x) ≥ c (IE),
sm ≤ s ≤ 1 and α+ ≥ 0 with q◦ deﬁned by TA.
To simplify the problem, we distinguish between the two parameter conﬁgurations
identiﬁed in Lemma 7. This lemma shows that in case (i), when c ≤ αoq, the IE condition
is satisﬁed for all contracts. We argue below that in case (i) the optimal contract, (α+∗, s∗),
should also satisfy α+∗ = 0.
In case (ii), when c > αoq, Lemma 7 shows that the optimal contract should have s∗ >
sm or α+∗ > 0 (or both), to induce the researcher to provide eﬀort. Our strategy here is to
ﬁrst analyse the case where the IE condition is binding but the other restrictions are not
(case ii.1). We show in the ﬁrst place that ﬁnding the optimal contract here is equivalent
to ﬁnding the optimal stopping rule. Then, we ﬁnd the contract that implements the
optimal stopping rule. This contract is shown to induce the stopping rule that maximises
the social welfare, B+V . Indeed, if it is possible, the best strategy for the organisation is
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to maximise the total surplus and to oﬀer the scientist a contract that induces the eﬃcient
stopping rule and covers the cost of eﬀort. In the parameter conﬁgurations in which this
contract is feasible (i.e., when the constraints on α+ and s are non-binding), this is the
solution. In the rest of parameter conﬁgurations, we ﬁnd the corner solutions that are
optimal (cases ii.2 and ii.3).
Case (i) Suppose ﬁrst that c ≤ αoq. Notice that in the cheapest contract possible,
α+ = 0 and s = sm, the researcher would choose q◦ = Q. If the organisation does not
choose α+ = 0 and s = sm, it is because it prefers a stopping rule q◦ such that q◦ < Q.
That is, the organisation would only use a diﬀerent contract if it wishes to lower the
stopping rule. Then, it is not optimal to increase α+ above zero because it would be more
expensive than to use s alone. Therefore, we should have α+∗ = 0. The optimal share s∗
is the one that maximises B(0, s) subject to sm ≤ s ≤ 1, with q◦ deﬁned by TA.
Case (ii.1) As mentioned above, if c > αoq, we have three cases. Let us ﬁrst suppose
that in addition to this, we have that the IE condition is binding but the other restrictions
are not, i.e. s ≥ sm, s ≤ 1 and α+ ≥ 0 are non-binding.
Let us ﬁrst rewrite the objective function, B. Adding and subtracting αoq in the
numerator of B from Lemma 6 (ii), we have
B(α+, s) =
(ρ+ αo)q + δ
R Q
q◦ (μx−A) dF (x)−
³
(αo + α+) q + sδ
R Q
q◦ (μx−A) dF (x)
´
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) .
On the other hand, from the deﬁnition of V in (2), and the IE condition written as
(1− δ)V = c, we have that
c =
(αo + α+) q + sδ
R Q
q◦ (μx−A) dF (x)
(1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) .
Substituting this into B, we can rewrite B as
B(α+, s) = 1
(1− δ)
Ã
(ρ+ αo)q + δ
R Q
q◦ (μx−A) dF (x)
(1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) − c
!
. (6)
Since s nor α+ appear explicitly in (6), B depends on s and α+ via q◦ only. Given that the
other restrictions are non-binding, the organisation should maximise (6) with respect to
q◦. We denote the optimal q◦ and the associated s and α+ as qe, se and α+e, respectively.
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We are now ready to characterise the candidate solution. Suppose ﬁrst that the solu-
tion is interior, i.e. qe < Q. Then qe makes the ﬁrst derivative of (6) equal to zero, i.e. it
satisﬁes
δF 0(qe)L(qe)
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (qe)])2
= 0, (7)
where L(q) is deﬁned as
L(q) ≡ (ρ+ αo)q + δ
Z Q
q
(μx−A) dF (x)− (μq −A) (1 + δ [1− F (q)]) .
Given that all ideas have positive probability, i.e., F 0(q) > 0 for all q, the ﬁrst-order con-
dition implies that L(qe) = 0. From the deﬁnition of a q◦ that satisﬁes the TA constraint
(and more precisely from (3)), we have that
L(qe) =
∙
(ρ+ αo)− α
o + α+e
se
¸
q.
Therefore, L(qe) = 0 implies that
α+e = se(ρ+ αo)− αo, (8)
and from the IE condition we obtain that
se ≡ c
(ρ+ αo)q + δμ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x)
,
and hence
α+e ≡ c(ρ+ α
o)
(ρ+ αo)q + δμ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x)
− αo.
In order to make sure that qe is a maximum of B, we need to show that the second
derivative of B at qe is negative. From (7), the sign of the second derivative at qe is equal
to the sign of
[F 00(qe)L(qe) + F 0(qe)L0(qe)] (1 + δ [1− F (qe)]) + 2δF 0(qe)F 0(qe)L(qe),
and given that L(qe) = 0 this is equal to
F 0(qe)L0(qe) (1 + δ [1− F (qe)]) .
Therefore the sign is equivalent to the sign of L0(qe), which is equal to
−μ (1 + δ [1− F (qe)]) < 0.
32
Suppose, second, that the solution is not interior, i.e. the optimal stopping rule never
induces commercialisation, qe = Q. Then, given that the IE constraint is binding, we
have α+e ≡ cq − αo. The optimal share should be such that no commercialisation is
induced, i.e. se = sm.
We are now going to gain some intution about the solution candidate. Substitute α+e
deﬁned in (8), into TA. As a result, we have
(μq◦ −A) = (ρ+ αo)q + δμ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x).
This shows that the optimal contract, which speciﬁes α+e, induces the stopping rule qo
that would be chosen to maximise the sum of the researcher’s and organisation’s proﬁts,
(B+V ). That is, se, α+e and the resulting qe maximise total welfare and satisfy IE with
equality.
Finally, this candidate solution is indeed a solution if and only if se ≤ 1, α+e ≥ 0,
which is the case when
c ≤ (ρ+ αo)q + δμ
Z Q
qe
(x− qe) dF (x) and c ≥ αoq +
αoδμ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x)
(ρ+ αo) . (9)
Case (ii.2) Assume that c > (ρ + αo)q + δμ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x), i.e., the share that
would be needed to implement the eﬃcient stopping rule is such that se > 1. For s = 1,
the IE condition deﬁnes
αc ≡
c− δμ
R Q
q◦ (x− q◦) dF (x)
q − α
o.
Note that αc ≥ 0, since c ≥ αoq + δμ
R Q
qo (x− qo) dF (x) is implied by c > (ρ + αo)q +
δμ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x) and q◦ > qe.
The optimal contract in this case is given by s∗ = 1 and α+∗ = αc. Indeed, the
optimal contract cannot be below the IE constraint because it would not induce eﬀort.
It cannot be strictly above, α+∗ > αc, either. This is because the IE constraint would
then be non-binding and from Corollary 3 we know that it is possible to keep q◦ constant
by decreasing s and α+, increasing the proﬁts of the organisation.
Case (ii.3)Assume c ≤ (ρ+αo)q+δμ
R Q
qe (x− qe) dF (x) and c < αoq+
αoδμ
?Q
qe (x−qe)dF (x)
(ρ+αo)
i.e., the commercial incentive required to implement the eﬃcient stopping rule is feasible,
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se ≤ 1, but the scientiﬁc incentive is not, α+e < 0. Then the optimal contract is in a
corner solution with α+∗ = 0. If α+∗ = 0, the IE condition can be rewritten as
s ≥ sc ≡ c− α
oq
δμ
R Q
qo (x− qo) dF (x)
.
Then the optimal share s∗ is the one that maximises B(0, s) subject to sc ≤ s ≤ 1, with
q◦ deﬁned by TA.
Proof of Corollary 9
The proof proceeds in three steps. In the ﬁrst, in the uniform case, we show that as we
increase αo the relevant regions in Proposition 8 are successively the ones in cases (ii.2),
(ii.1), (ii.3) and (i). In the second step we argue that, although in case (ii.2) the optimal
share s∗ is constant and equal to 1, it is decreasing as a function of αo in case (ii.1). In
the third step, we show that in case (i), the optimal share is increasing in αo, at least for
ρ < ρ(αo) and A = 0.
Step 1: ordering of cut-oﬀs. Clearly, if αo > 2c, we are in case (i). If, instead,
αo < 2c, we are in cases (ii.1), (ii.2) or (ii.3) depending on the cut-oﬀs deﬁned in (9).
It is easy to show that both m(αo) and n(αo), deﬁned as
m(αo) ≡ (ρ+ αo) + δμ (1− qe)2 and n(αo) ≡ αo + α
oδμ (1− qe)2
(ρ+ αo) ,
where
1− qe = 1δμ
p
μ2 − μδ (ρ+ αo − 2 (μ−A))− μ,
are increasing in αo and that m(αo) ≥ n(αo) for any αo. Then, from (9), case (ii.1) in the
uniform case is deﬁned for αo < αo < αo, where αo and αo are deﬁned as m(αo) = 2c and
n(αo) = 2c. Clearly, if αo < αo we are in case (ii.2) and if αo < αo < 2c, we are in case
(ii.3).
Step 2: s∗ decreasing as a function of αo for αo < αo < αo. Here, we are in case
(ii.1) of Proposition 8 and qe solves L(q) = 0, where in the case of a uniform distribution
L(q) can be simpliﬁed to
L(q) = 1
2
(ρ+ αo) + 1
2
μδ (1− q)2 − (μq −A),
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and solving,
qe = 1 + δδ −
1
δ
s
μ− δ (ρ+ αo − 2 (μ−A))
μ .
If qe is the solution to the problem, the optimal share is given by se, where in this case,
se = c
(ρ+ αo)1
2
+ δμ1
2
(1− qe)2
.
Notice that
sign
µ ∂se
∂αo
¶
= −sign∂
¡
(ρ+ αo)1
2
+ δμ1
2
(1− qe)2
¢
∂αo
and, substituting qe and se, and simplifying,
∂
¡
(ρ+ αo)1
2
+ δμ1
2
(1− qe)2
¢
∂αo =
1
2
−δμ (1− qe) ∂q
e
∂αo =
μp
μ2 − μδ (ρ+ αo − 2 (μ−A))
> 0,
Hence se is decreasing in αo.
Step 3: s∗ increasing as a function of αo for αo > 2c. Here we are in case (i) of
Proposition 8. As shown in the proposition, IE is never binding and α+ = 0. Given that
A = 0, s∗ solves
max
s
ρ+ (1− s)δμ (1− q◦2)
2 (1− δ) (1 + δ (1− q◦))
s.t. s ≥ α
o
2μ , s ≤ 1, and q
o =
(1 + δ)
δ −
1
δ
s
sμ(1 + 2δ)− δαo
sμ .
Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst-order condition is given by
−δμ (1− q◦2) (1 + δ(1− q◦)) + δ(ρ+ (1− s)μP (q◦))∂q◦∂s
2 (1− δ) (1 + δ(1− q◦))2
= 0,
where
P (q) ≡ δ
¡
1− q2
¢
− 2q (1 + δ (1− q)) .
By the implicit function theorem, and given that the derivative of the ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to s is negative (because it is a maximum), we have that ∂s∗∂αo shares the same
sign as the derivative of the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to αo. The numerator of
such derivative (divided by δ) is given by
μ [2q◦ + δ(1− q◦) (1 + 3q◦)] ∂q
◦
∂αo+(ρ+(1−s)μP )
∂2q◦
∂s∂αo−2(1−s)μ (1 + δ (1− q
◦))
∂q◦
∂s
∂q◦
∂αo .
35
It is easy to show that ∂q
◦
∂s < 0,
∂q◦
∂αo > 0 and
∂2q◦
∂s∂αo < 0. Then, it is suﬃcient to show
that ρ+ (1− s)μP < 0. First notice that
∂P (q)
∂q = −2δq − 2− 2δ (1− 2q) = −2− 2δ (1− q) < 0,
and P (qˆ) = 0 where
qˆ ≡ (1 + δ)δ −
1
δ
√
1 + 2δ < (1 + δ)δ −
1
δ
r
1
s (s+ 2sδ − δα
o) = qo.
Therefore, P (qo) < P (qˆ) = 0. Hence, we have that for ρ < ρ(αo), ∂s∗∂αo > 0.
Proof of Proposition 10
At t = 1 the researcher does research and at the end of the period obtains q1 and A1. He
has to decide whether to do research or development during t = 2. If he chooses to look
for a new idea, at the end of the second period he obtains, q2 and A2 and a payoﬀ of α2q2.
At this point, he would have to decide whether to do research again at t = 3, obtaining
α3q3 at the end of the period, or to commercialise, obtaining s3(μq2 − A2). If instead he
decides to do development at t = 2 he obtains s2(μq1 −A1) at the end of the second and
α30q30 at the end of t = 3. In summary the ex-post payoﬀs are if he chooses to do research
in the second and the third,
α1q1 + δα2q2 + δ2α3q3,
if, instead he decides to do research in the second and development in the third, he obtains
α1q1 + δα2q2 + δ2s3(μq2 −A2),
and ﬁnally, if he decides to commercialise in the second (and therefore do research in the
third), he obtains
α1q1 + δs2(μq1 −A1) + δ2α30q30 .
Solving the game by backward induction, the researcher will decide to develop in the
last period if and only if
s3(q2 + a2) ≥ α30q30 . (10)
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Deﬁne for every q2 the level bA2(q2) as the one that satisﬁes s2 ³μq2 − bA2(q2)´ = αq30 ,
with bA2(q2) increasing in q2. Going backwards, he will develop in the second period if
and only if
s2(μq1−A1) ≥ α2q2−δα30q30+δ
Z Q
0
Z ?A2(x)
A2
s3(μx−y)dH2(y)dG2(x)+δα3q3
Z Q
0
(1−H2( bA2(x))dG2(x).
Proof of Corollary 11
In the stationary environment, the stopping rule after the second period of research is
s(μq2 −A2) = αq, (11)
and when distributions are stationary, then we can rearrange the terms of the ﬁrst period
stopping rule as
s(μq1 −A1) = αq + δ
Z Q
0
Z ?A2(x)
A2
[s(μx− y)− αq] dH(y)dG(x). (12)
Since by deﬁnition the function in the integral is positive in that domain, we have that
the left-hand side is higher in (12) than in (11) and, therefore, the researcher is less likely
to develop (for the same realised q and A) in the second period than in the third.
Proof of Proposition 12
If Ai ≡ 0 and μ = 1 we have that the stopping rule in the ﬁrst and second periods is
deﬁned by qo1 and qo2, where
s2qo1 + δα3q¯3 = α2q2 + δs3
Z Q
qo
2
(x− qo2)dG2(x) + δα30q30 and qo2 =
α30q30
s3
and
V = α1q1 + δs2qo1 + δ2α3q¯3 + δs2
Z Q
qo
1
(x− qo1)dG1(x). (14)
A mean preserving spread of eq1 implies an increase in the integral term of V and has
no eﬀect on qo2 and qo1. Hence, it increases V . A mean preserving spread of eq2, increases
the integral in the ﬁrst period time allocation. As a result qo1 increases and given that
∂V
∂qo1
= δG1(qo1)s2μ > 0,
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we have that it also increases V . This completes the ﬁrst part of the proof.
Let us denote G+i (q) and G−i (q) two distribution functions, in which the ﬁrst is a mean
preserving spread of the second. In this case we have that V
¡
G+1
¢
− V
¡
G−1
¢
is equal to
δs2
Z Q
qo
1(G
+
1 )
(x− qo1
¡
G+1
¢
)dG+1 (x)− δs2
Z Q
qo
1(G
−
1 )
(x− qo1
¡
G−1
¢
)dG−1 (x),
and V
¡
G+2
¢
− V
¡
G−2
¢
equal to
δs2
Ã
qo1
¡
G+2
¢
+
Z Q
qo
1(G
+
2 )
(x− qo1
¡
G+2
¢
)dG1(x)− qo1
¡
G−2
¢
−
Z Q
qo
1(G
−
2 )
(x− qo1
¡
G−2
¢
)dG1(x)
!
.
Suppose that we take a mean preserving spread of G1(q). In this case qo1
¡
G+1
¢
=
qo1
¡
G−1
¢
. An increase in s2 increases the incentives to take more risk, given that
∂
£
V
¡
G+1
¢
− V
¡
G−1
¢¤
∂s2
= δ
∙Z qo
1
0
xdG−1 (x)−
Z qo
1
0
xdG+1 (x)
¸
> 0.
But, if we increase s3 we have that
∂
£
V
¡
G+1
¢
− V
¡
G−1
¢¤
∂s3
= δ2
£
G+1 (qo1)−G−1 (qo1)
¤ Z Q
qo
2
(x− qo2)dG2(x),
whose sign coincides with the sign of G+1 (qo1)−G−1 (qo1). Given that one is a mean preserv-
ing spread of the other we have that G+1 (qo1)−G−1 (qo1) > 0 if and only if qo1 > q¯1.
Suppose now that we take a mean preserving spread of G2(q). In this case qo1
¡
G+2
¢
>
qo1
¡
G−2
¢
. Simplifying, we have that an increase in s2, decreases V
¡
G+2
¢
−V
¡
G−2
¢
. Indeed,
simplifying, we have that
∂
£
V
¡
G+2
¢
− V
¡
G−2
¢¤
∂s2
= δ
Z Q
qo
1(G
+
2 )
xdG1(x)− δ
Z Q
qo
1(G
−
2 )
xdG1(x) < 0,
whereas the derivative of V
¡
G+2
¢
− V
¡
G−2
¢
with respect to s3 is equal to
δ2G1(qo1
¡
G+2
¢
)
Z Q
qo
2
(x− qo2)dG+2 (x)− δ2G1(qo1
¡
G−2
¢
)
Z Q
qo
2
(x− qo2)dG−2 (x)
and this is greater than 0 because qo1
¡
G+2
¢
> qo1
¡
G−2
¢
.
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